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In his 1966 Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge titled On the Causes of the 
Slow Rate of Economic Growth in the UK, the Hungarian-born British 
economist Nicholas Kaldor presented a series of “laws” to account for the 
growth rate differences between Britain and 12 more successful 
economies, such as the US, Germany and France. He called his method 
Circular Cumulative Causation, a multi-causal approach where the 
interdependencies between the explanatory factors were strong and the 
variables were interlinked in the determination of the outcome. In Kaldor’s 
interpretation, the UK’s main problem at that time was the slow growth of 
productivity, caused by slow growth in the manufacturing sector. Why did 
that matter? He found that industrial productivity was positively related to 
the growth of industry – i.e. the law of increasing returns to scale was 
strongly manifested. The objective, methodology and central analytical 
concepts of this paper are similar. We will examine the causes of slow 
growth in the Hungarian economy. As will be seen, the increasing returns 
to scale, which Kaldor took from Young’s (1928) seminal study, also 
occupy a central position in this paper. 
2. The Facts 
2.1 The Red Queen paradox 
For average Hungarians, the regime change of 1989/1990 did not 
produce the expected result: the country was unable to catch up with the 
Western market economies, even after two decades. While fundamental 
changes did occur on a broad front, our economic rivals also advanced as 
fast as Hungary. This is the so-called Red Queen Paradox, an often-used 
metaphor in everyday life, such as in economics, arms races, and 
evolutionary biology. 
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The Red Queen is a fictional character in Lewis Carroll's fantasy 
novella Through the Looking-Glass, the sequel to Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland. Speaking with Alice, the central heroine of both works, the 
Red Queen describes her empire as a system in which “it takes all the 
running you can do to keep in the same place.” In narrow, economic terms 
this is a perfect depiction of capitalist rivalry: if your competitors are 
moving ahead, you must move faster to not lose ground. In broader 
evolutionary terms (Van Valen 1973), the message is, “For an evolutionary 
system, continuing development is needed just to maintain its fitness 
relative to the systems it is co-evolving with.” 
 
2.1.1  Competition worldwide 
 
While the Red Queen Paradox is not well known in Hungarian 
economic parlance,1 its primary message did become frequently used in 
policy discussions: Hungary must grow twice as fast as the EU countries 
to catch up with them. 
Is it possible to catch up with the forerunners and leave them behind? 
The first intuitive answer is yes. Hungary has a mid-sized developed 
economy with a per capita GDP level 25% higher than the world average. 
Between certain selected years – such as 1997–2006 – the Hungarian 
economy did grow faster than the EU-15,2 and there were four calendar 
years (2002–2005) when the Hungarian growth rate was at least twice as 
high as the EU-15 average. Furthermore, if we disaggregate growth by 
regions, the numbers show that the Central Hungarian Region’s per capita 
GDP surpassed the EU-27 average in 2004. Why should there be any 
doubt that the performance of the most developed Hungarian region can be 
emulated by the country as a whole in the next 2 to 3 decades?3 
Yet there are good reasons to be wary of all this optimism. First, as 
shown elsewhere (Mihályi 2011a, b, c), during the last 140 years, Hungary 
had been unable to sustain above-average growth rates except for very 
short cyclical upswings. Kornai (1972) described this feature as the 
alteration of rush and harmonic growth periods. As illustrated in 
Figure 11-1, the exceptionally high and low growth rates should be 
interpreted in a comparative perspective, as the Red Queen Paradox 
                                                          
1 L. Carroll’s name is known thanks to his first book, which was translated into 
Hungarian in the 1930s. 
2 EU-15, as defined in EU statistics: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. 
3 Continued EU assistance can be also taken into account. 
Péter Mihályi  243 
suggests. During this long time span, when Hungary was sometimes 
capable of producing a high average rate – such as the 3.8% in 1950–
1973 – the EU-12 countries4 displayed even higher growth rates. Between 
1990 and 2008, Hungary outperformed the EU-12, but its 2.2% growth 
was not particularly outstanding relative to the world average. In 
examining the entire period, there were several countries that produced 
2 to 3 times higher than average growth rates for a sustained period of time 
(e.g., Venezuela in 1870–1949; Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong in 1950–1989; 





Fig. 11-1 Long term growth rates of GDP/head in Hungary, in EU-12 and the 
world, 1870–2008 (Annual average changes in percentage) 
Source: Mihályi (2011a) based on Maddison (2010) 
 
Second, the example of the former German Democratic Republic is 
also compelling. In spite of the billions of Euros channelled from West 
Germany towards the Eastern Länder, the level gap hardly shrank after 
unification. Using a sophisticated econometric forecasting technique, 
Aumann and Scheufele (2010) concluded that it may require another 50 
years for the Eastern provinces of Germany to eliminate the gap with their 
                                                          
4 EU-12, as defined in Maddison (2010): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. 
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Western peers. Third, there are important examples even among developed 
countries, where the distances actually grew between competitors. Using 
the US as a benchmark (= 100), Switzerland once achieved 93% and then 
fell back to 81%, Italy slid from 70% to 64%. The case of Japan is even 
more striking. Once widely admired, Japan climbed to 82% by 1996, but 
then by 2008 fell to 73% of the US income level. The list of failed 
catching-up stories is even longer if 5 to 6 Latin American countries and 
8 to 10 African countries are included, where growth was not simply 
slower than in the US but actually negative.5 
2.1.2  Competition among the transition economies 
Once Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, a new type of 
rivalry started; a competition between the former socialist countries in 
catching up with the core countries of the EU-15. Hungary was first 
compared with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland – the so-called 
Visegrád countries – but later the three Baltic countries were included in 
the standard analysis. During the first post-communist decade, Hungary 
always fared favourably in this comparison. However, in the next 10 years, 
this advantage was lost. As Figure 11-2 illustrates, Hungary hardly made 
any advancement between 1989 and 2010 relative to her new peers. 
Relative to the EU-15 average, Hungary advanced merely 1 percentage 
point in 20 years, from 54% to 55%. In the same period, Poland advanced 
from 38% of the EU-15 average to 55% (a total of 17 percentage points). 
While the raw data and the visual presentation suggest that Hungary’s 
performance in this kind of Red Queen Race was just about “normal,” this 
is not the public perception. In regard to comparison, people usually 
disregard the weaker competitors and envy the stronger ones. There are 
not many Hungarians who are impressed by a scholar or politician saying 
that Russia or Ukraine displayed an even worse performance than “we 
did”. Instead, they point to Poland and Slovakia, which were able to 
significantly reduce the gap separating them from the more advanced EU 
countries. For the average Hungarian, the case of Slovakia is even more 
relevant because this country was not only better in relative terms but also 
surpassed Hungary in absolute terms by 2007. 
 
                                                          
5 All figures cited in this paragraph were calculated from Maddison (2010). 
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Fig. 11-2 Economic convergence of selected transition economies towards the 
average of EU-15 between 1989–2010 
(Percentage points, GDP/head at purchasing power parity, EU-15 = 100) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Darvas (2011) raw data and methodology 
2.2 Natural endowments and economic policies matter 
Since the previously mentioned Kaldor study (1966), analytical 
frameworks and tools have been significantly enriched. When countries at 
comparable levels of development are assessed today, the “laws” that 
might explain their differences are formulated at least in three separate 
dimensions: (i) natural endowments; (ii) economic policies; (iii) balance-
of-payments; and (iv) supply-side analysis. In the next few paragraphs, 
“laws” (i) – (iii) will be briefly discussed to leave space for the fourth 
explanatory dimension, the mechanisms determining the supply-side of the 
economy, and within this, the changes in productivity. 
2.2.1 Unfavourable geography 
The success of the Japanese economy during the 1960s was used to 
belittle the importance of natural endowments in many parts of the world, 
including Hungary. “Japan has no raw materials, yet she is producing 
miraculous growth rates” was the resounding verdict at that time. 
However, after the first oil shock in 1973 and the rapid enrichment of 
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some OPEC countries this alleged “law” went slowly out of fashion. 
Beyond the oil-rich Arab countries, the examples of Norway, the UK and – 
more recently – post-communist Russia have convinced everyone that the 
availability of raw materials is a major economic asset that can greatly 
contribute to the growth of a country. Similarly, the same holds true for 
monopoly positions (such as sea ports, maritime transit routes, summer 
beaches, and winter ski resorts). In this context, it is worth mentioning 
how in his latest book Jeffrey Sachs (2011) challenges the conventional 
view regarding European vs. USA comparisons. According to Sachs, 
America’s long-standing advantage in per capita GDP has been due to its 
geography rather than its economic system. America has vastly more land 
and natural resources per person than does Western Europe. This has been 
the source of its enduring advantage, rather than the allegedly better 
incentive mechanism, the lower taxes, the better institutions or the 
restrained activity of the state (Sachs 2011, 225–226).6 Without any further 
illustration and/or explanation, we submit that the weak economic 
performance of Hungary is partly due to her unfavourable resource 
endowments. 
2.2.2  Inept economic policies do harm 
The importance of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies in 
determining the growth trajectory of a given country has also become 
commonplace since the 1960s. This understanding has been forcefully 
supported by the recent worldwide calamities of the post-Lehman period. 
Partly due to her size and poor resource endowment, Hungary has been 
traditionally a very open economy. Currently, the combined value of her 
exports and imports is equal to 140% of annual GDP. In this context, it is 
important to refer back to those years – already mentioned above – when 
the Hungarian GDP growth figures were two times higher than in the EU. 
This is precisely when the country’s balance-of-payments displayed a 
deficit of 7–8% in four consecutive years. Moreover, during the last 10 
years, the central government, the local governments, the business sector 
and even the household sector pursued the same strategy of reaching for 
low-hanging fruit. Everybody was borrowing and – apart from the central 
bank – nobody was willing and/or capable to accumulate significant 
foreign (reserve) assets. As a result, Hungary has the worst position among 
the EU-27 countries concerning net international positions (Figure 11-3). 
The country’s total net debt was equal to 113% of its annual GDP, a figure 
                                                          
6 This is not a new idea in Sachs’ academic oeuvre. See also Gallup and Sachs and 
Mellinge (1998). 
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far more worrisome than those of Romania or Poland (64%) or the Czech 
Republic (49%). Thus, considering the entire 1990–2010 period, the 





Fig. 11-3 Net international positions of the EU-27 in 2010 
Source: European Commission (2012a, 4) 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can apprehensively state that in terms 
of GDP growth the ballooning indebtedness of Hungary brought very 
disappointing results. As we will discuss, the borrowed money was 
primarily used to sustain consumption rather than to finance productive 
capital investments. With this strategy, the country reached a fiscal wall. 
Neither the markets nor the international financial institutions are likely to 
be willing to finance additional (net) borrowing. A long and painful period 
of deleveraging lies in wait for Hungary. 
                                                          
7 From the recent Hungarian assessments available in English language, see e.g. 
Antal (2004), Szapáry (2006), Győrffy (2009), Csillag and Mihályi (2006), Török 
(2010) and EEAG (2012). 
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2.3 A simple decomposition 
















GDP  = productivity  
ageworkinginPopulation
Workers  = employment rate 
populationTotal
ageworkinginPopulation  = dependency ratio, 
 















  (2) 
From the evidence presented in the previous sections, we can state 
without any additional investigation that Hungary suffers from two (not 
necessarily related) problems expressed in equations (1) and (2) – the low 
level of economic development and its slow annual increase. 
Analysing the three components in reverse, the assessment of the 
dependency ratio (as defined here for our purposes) is relatively 
straightforward. In 1980, 10 years before the regime change, the share of 
the working (15–64) age in the total population was 64.6%. This number 
rose to 66.2% by 1990 and 68.7% by 2011. This is a change in the right 
direction; the growth problem of Hungary did not originate from here! 
During the last 10 to 15 years, participants in Hungarian policy 
discussions have heavily focused on the employment rate, the second 
component of Equation (1). Even those economists who fundamentally 
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disagree on each and every detail of fiscal and monetary policies tend to 
accept without further analysis that this is the largest problem in Hungary. 
Indeed, the EU-wide international comparisons unequivocally show that 
Hungary “excels” with its lowest figure. According to the Eurostat 
methodology, the Hungarian rate was 55.4% in 2010, exactly 
10 percentage points lower than the EU-15 average (66.4%) and the 




Fig. 11-4 Changes in the Hungarian employment rate, 1996–2010 (In percentage of 
the 15–64 age group) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
However, what matters for the volume of production (GDP) is not the 
absolute number of workers but the amount of work these people perform 
in terms of working hours. The employment rate is low in Hungary 
because part-time employment is unpopular.9 For those who do work in 
Hungary, they do so for 1,961 hours a year on average, which is well 
above the OECD average of 1,749 hours. Perhaps it is surprising that 
Greece is the only country that has a higher figure. As Figure 11-5 on the 
next page shows, the Dutch, the Germans and the Norwegians are all 
below 1,500 hours. If Hungary’s GDP is low, the problem must be hidden 
elsewhere. 
 
                                                          
8 Malta used to be ranked lower than Hungary, but lately their figure rose from 
55.0% in 2009 to 56.1% in 2010. Among the OECD countries, however, Italy and 
Turkey have slightly worse numbers than Hungary (OECD 2012, 25). 
9 In 2010, the share of part-time workers was 5.5% in Hungary and 21.4% in the 
EU-15. 





Fig. 11-5 Average annual working time in selected OECD countries, 2010 (Hours 
per worker) 
Source: OECD (2011) 
 
As the numbers in Table 11-1 show, the variation of annual working 
hours around the calculated base for comparison (Hungary = 100) is in a 
rather narrow range (87–127%) and the absolute numbers in col. [1] are 
not correlated with the broadly varying GDP/head figures. Take, for 
example, Norway, Austria and Poland. The number of working hours per 
head of the total population is almost exactly the same in the three 
countries, while the GDP/head figure in Austria is twice as high as in 
Poland, and the Norwegian figure is three times higher than the Polish one. 
Thus, we can now safely state as a conclusion that the low level and the 
weak dynamics of labour productivity are responsible for the Hungary’s 
poor overall economic results. 
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Table 11-1 The relationship between total working time and economic 
development in 2008–2009 
 
Country Annual working hours per 
population 
GDP/Head 
Hours Percentage 1990. international dollars 
(PPP) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Czech 
Republic 
946 127 12 868 
Portugal 900 121 14 436 
Slovakia 837 113 13 033 
Romania 832 112 4 895 
Norway 816 110 28 500 
Austria 816 110 24 131 
Poland 816 110 10 160 
Greece 811 109 16 362 
… …     
HUNGARY  744 100 9 500 
France 707 95 22 223 
Belgium 702 94 23 655 
Italy 692 93 19 909 
Turkey 650 87 8 066 
Source: [1] and [2] own calculations from Eurostat (2009), [3] Maddison (2010) 
Notes: Annual working hours are calculated in [1] for the entire population, 
including everyone. Data reflect the amount of work performed in the first quarter 
of 2009. Thus, the data show the state of the labour market before the international 
financial crisis. GDP/head data in [3] refer to the year 2008. 
3. The problem is labour productivity 
3.1 Education is not the answer 
Many policy makers and good-willed political commentators honestly 
believe that more higher education is the No. 1 recipe for growth. The 
opposite is true. 
In search for explanations and solutions to combat relative economic 
backwardness, most observers tend to overlook the positive legacy of 
socialist central planning. From the vantage point of the present paper, it is 
important to note that higher education was a top priority of the fallen 
system. As a result, 20 years after the fall of communism the population of 
the former socialist countries still has significantly more years of 
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schooling than capitalist countries of similar development levels. Russia is 
a perfect illustration. According to OECD (2009), 54% of the 25–64 age 
cohorts in Russia possess a higher education degree, in stark contrast with 
Japan and the US (40%) or the Swiss (30%). Because socialist planning 
systems looked at higher education as having merit, it was provided free of 
charge. From the perspective of Hungary, the comparison with neighbouring 
Austria is noteworthy. The share of adults with a university degree is about 
18% in both countries, while the difference in per capita GDP levels is 
more than 2:1. 
 
Table 11-2 The number of independent tertiary education institutions, 
1970–2008 
 










Source: Central Statistical Office. Statistical yearbooks, various years 
 
In this regard, the situation has only worsened since 1990. In the 
2010/2011 academic year, 1 out of 3 university students was enrolled in 
some kind of part-time, distance learning program rather than a regular, 
full-time program. In 1990/1991, this proportion was only 1:4 (Figure 
11-6).10 This tendency has led to a numerical overproduction of university 
graduates, which is a further fragmentation of the higher educational 
system and – as Polónyi and Timár (2001) warned long ago – to deteriorating 
quality throughout the entire network.11 Anecdotal examples suggest an 
                                                          
10 It is noteworthy that there are only few degrees that can be earned in full-time 
university programs only, such as medicine and architecture. 
11 It is more appropriate to state that Hungary, similar to many other former 
socialist countries, is suffering from a “quasi-development” problem (Jánossy 
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additional problem: part-time university students are usually not very 
effective workers because they must divide their attentions and energies 




Fig. 11-6 The composition of students in higher education, 1970–2011 (Number of 
students) 
Source: Central Statistical Office. Statistical Yearbook (1991, 254), Fazekas and 
Kézdi (2011, 203) 
 
Since the regime change, many Hungarian workers possessing only 8 
years of schooling are unable to find jobs because the jobs they would 
traditionally fill are now filled by others possessing a degree from middle-
schools (8 + 4 years). On the basis of this finding, many experts are 
convinced that the government must channel additional resources to 
expand the network of secondary schools. The argument is that without a 
good middle-school education the upcoming generation of young people 
will not meet the diverse skill requirements of the labour market. This 
paper is not the proper place to go into the details of this debate. However, 
perhaps it is enough to state that while in Hungary only one-third of this 
social stratum are employed, in other EU countries, such as Portugal, 
Greece and Denmark, two-thirds of the workers with 8 years of schooling 
find a job. 
We have a precise and detailed picture regarding the knowledge levels 
and the competencies of the future generation Hungarian workers, i.e., 
                                                                                                                         
1969). A lot of education has been obtained, but a poor economy has resulted 
because of the poor quality of teaching. 
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those who have just completed the 8-year long mandatory elementary 
schools. The results of the 2009 PISA-test Program12 show that the 
competencies of average Hungarian 15-year-old students in reading, 
mathematics and natural sciences are comparable with the OECD country 
averages. In most comparisons, the Hungarian students are on par with 
their peers studying in Sweden, Denmark and France. In 2009, the 





Fig. 11-7 PISA-test results and the OECD countries’ economic development levels 
(Results from science for 15-year-old students in 2006 and per capita GDP levels 
at purchasing parity rates) 
Source: OECD PISA 2006 database, Table F2.12a  
 
As the regression calculation in Figure 11-7 shows, there is a logic 
according to which some countries are significantly above the regression 
line (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland), while others are below it 
(Italy, Greece and Norway). The former group of countries are all 
transitional economies with a long tradition of socialist central planning. 
The second group proves that in striving for economic growth and 
development, countries with favourable natural endowments can 
compensate for the lower quality of their labour force. 
                                                          
12 The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a worldwide 
evaluation in 65 countries of 15-year-old school pupils’ scholastic performance, 
performed first in 2000 and repeated by the organizer (OECD) every three years. 
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3.2 In- and outward migration – an underutilised potential 
In many countries, outward migration is an important source of 
economic growth. In such cases, the economic rationale is that the 
migrating labourers can generate more added value in a more advanced 
economy than at home, and their home country benefits from this higher 
income through the repatriation of the higher earnings (remittances). It is a 
well-known example that, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, such 
migration greatly contributed to the overall development of Hungary. This 
was also the policy that was successfully applied by Italy during the late 
1950s and by Yugoslavia in the 1960s. After joining the EU in 2004, the 
legal conditions of outward migration have changed favourably, but 
Hungarians did not move in significant numbers unlike other post-
communist countries. In 2009, Romanian and Polish workers sent home 
€2.9 billion and €2.7 billion, respectively, while in Hungary the net 
balance of remittances was minus €50 million. 
Another way of enhancing a country’s growth potential is the import of 
labour. After World War II, Germany, Spain, the UK and Ireland used 
slightly different policies, but they all benefitted from the use of under-
qualified inexpensive workers from Southern Europe. Such a strategy is 
currently being pursued by Russia and to a smaller extent by the Ukraine, 
exploiting the labour reservoir of the ex-Soviet republics (Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, etc.). The United States is also a net importer, but her strategy 
is – not fully, but to a large extent – based on brain drain. Highly qualified 
intellectuals are imported from Europe, the Middle East, China and India. 
While some experts have already started to make forecasts about 
Hungary’s future immigration needs,13 the present situation is unfavourable 
both in the labour market and social-cultural dimensions. To become an 
attractive country for immigration, unskilled foreign workers should 
calculate net savings of €500–1,000 per month. However, Hungary’s tax 
and benefit policies (that compress wage distribution) are a major hurdle. 
Depending on the exchange rate, the average net wage is €460, and the 
official gross minimal wage is €320. In Hungary today, for a single worker 
without children earning the average wage, take home pay is only half of 
what it costs to employ him. From such a low net income, there is no way 
to save enough to provide for the family back home. Qualified foreign 
workers, in theory, could aspire to higher amounts of savings, but the 
barriers of the Hungarian language are almost insurmountable for them. In 
addition, the Hungarian public is notoriously intolerant vis-à-vis foreigners 
                                                          
13 Polónyi and Timár (2001) calculated that the Hungarian labour market would 
need 20,000 immigrants per year for the next 40 years. 
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and towards ethnically different people in particular. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that any political party would dare to start a political discussion 
on the benefits of immigration in the near future. 
While the politicians’ caution and fear from public sentiments are 
understandable, discarding the possibility of both types of migration 
(inward and outward) is a luxury that Hungary can hardy allow for itself in 
the future. 
3.3 Our answer: Far too many micro-firms 
As previously stated, the main problem in Hungary is the low average 
level of productivity. The next step is to analyse its variation. There are 
two dimensions where these variations are obtrusive. First, productivity 
differs drastically according to the size of firms. Second, but chiefly as a 
consequence of the first finding, there are huge territorial differences 
within the country. 
3.3.1 The missing increasing returns to scale 
During the last 20 years, many studies proved that there were large and 
growing productivity differences in Hungary between the large firms and 
small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs). As a static fact, this is not a 
specific Hungarian puzzle; the same was found in international 
comparisons (Lewis 2004, McKinsey Global Institute 2010, EC Enterprise 
and Industry 2010). However, it is important to note that, prior to 1990, 
large (state-owned) enterprises played a dominant role in the Hungarian 
economy and the regime change brought a reversal in this regard. Partly, 
this was unavoidable. Moreover, similar to nearly all industrialised 
nations, Hungary has also witnessed a shift in labour from the secondary 
sector, where firms were generally larger, to the tertiary sector (services), 
where they are smaller.14 
There are other factors. According to a Hungarian saying, policy 
makers fell from the other side of the horse, i.e., the country moved from 
                                                          
14 In Kaldor’s time, the share of the secondary sector (manufacturing + construction) 
was 31% in UK’s total employment, but it started to fall rapidly. By 2010, it was 
somewhere around 15% only. In Hungary, after the rapid restructuring of the entire 
economy, the contraction of the secondary sector did not start until 2002, and it 
was very slow even after that. In relative terms within total employment, the share 
was 29.6% in that year and the 2010 figure was only slightly lower (27.1%). In 
other words, it still matters what is happening in these two traditional sectors of the 
Hungarian economy. 
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one extreme position to the opposite. In 1989, there were approximately 
2,500 enterprises with more than 250 employees; the latest figure for 2009 
was 870. The number of sole proprietors in 1988 was 300,000; today the 
number is 1.4 million (2010). In other words, there is a continuing 
fragmentation of the nation’s entrepreneurial capital stock. In 2008, the 
annual value added of a Hungarian micro-enterprise was HUF 4.5 million 
per employee, while the same figure was HUF 8.2 million in large firms. 
The trend is negative. In 1998, the difference was only 150%; it was 182% 
in 2008 (Pitti 2010a). If we look at the 2009 data of the top 200 non-
financial Hungarian firms, the average per capita output in this elite group 
was HUF 67 million, while the corresponding figure was HUF 21 million, 
which is a three-fold difference, in the rest of the economy. It is alarming 
that since 2000 the absolute number of middle-size and large companies 
has been falling. The same holds for the changes in the structure of 
employment. This is the opposite of European trends. While elsewhere the 
process of concentration prevails, in Hungary the fragmentation of 
resources are to be observed almost everywhere.15 (The Hungarian 
categorisation of micro, small, medium-size and large firms is fully in line 
with the methodology of Eurostat. For detailed comparative data in all four 
enterprise categories used in the EU, see Appendix). 
The size problems also have a very important sectorial dimension. The 
productivity gap is not so worrisome in industry because many firms today 
are run as subsidiaries of western multinational companies. Foreign-owned 
manufacturing companies still operate, and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the productivity of the Hungarian employees in these subsidiaries is 
the same or even higher than in countries such as Germany and Austria 
where the mother companies have their own plants. However, the situation 
in the construction industry is alarming. Currently, there are 100,000 
domestic companies operating (at least on paper) within the sector; in 
1990, that number was slightly more than 5,000. Among the construction 
firms today, there are only 250 that are large enough to be qualified as a 
shareholding company – all of the other enterprises are limited liability 
companies owned by a single proprietor, a family or a very small number 
of connected entrepreneurs. The situation is even worse in agriculture, 
where 40% of the country’s agricultural land is cultivated by people who 
call themselves “farmers,” although only 3% of them have a specialised 
degree from a tertiary educational institution. This is a politically vocal 
                                                          
15 At the very top of the company pyramid – firms with more than 5,000 employees 
– there is a positive change, but not sufficiently strong. In 2004, the number of 
such privately owned firms was 11, while 14 such firms were registered in 2009. 
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and therefore important social group of 5–600,000 agrarians.16 Because 
these “farmers” are under-qualified, they continue to produce what they 
have seen from their fathers – grain. There are approximately 180,000 
farmer households currently registered as grain producers. In a country of 
the size of Hungary, 180 large farms would most likely be too many. 
Under such conditions, it is fully understandable why the total output of 
the Hungarian agricultural sector has been in free fall since 1990. In 2010, 
the level was the same as in the early 1970s, despite gigantic government 
and EU subsidies. The productivity gap is also substantial in certain parts 
of the service sector, where 63% of the jobs are to be found. In some 
areas, the multinationals have a strong and exclusive presence (e.g., 
banking, telecommunication), but in other areas (e.g., catering, retail trade) 
small Hungarian firms and public institutions dominate the job market. 
The problem in retail trade or catering is striking for any client with open 
eyes. In small Hungarian-owned shops and restaurants, one can often see 
assistants and waiters doing nothing because the premises are simply 
empty. By contrast, has anyone ever seen a McDonald’s or a Tesco 
hypermarket in which employees were not busy all the time? And these 
observations are not just anecdotal. According to the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH 2010), the number of retail trade outlets in 2009 was 2.5 
times more than in 1989, while the total turnover at constant prices grew 
by only 5%! The same source shows the same tendency in catering. In 
2009, there were almost twice as many functioning restaurants and cafes 
than in 1989, although the turnover in terms of volume actually fell by 
15%. The same holds for public sector employees, which is very high by 
international comparison.17 Two-thirds of these employees are working in 
very fragmented Hungarian local government institutions (e.g., general 
administration, education, health). 
The issues discussed above also have important territorial (regional) 
dimensions. Since 1996, the Hungarian Statistical Office has been 
regularly publishing a GDP/head time series for the country’s seven 
administrative regions. Figure 11-8 shows the disparity in these inter-
                                                          
16 Land ownership is even more fragmented than land cultivation. The number of 
registered farm land owners is 3.3 mn. According to the 2010 National Farm 
Survey, 60% of them are subsistence farmers, i.e. they do not even intend to 
market their own produce. From the total amount of labour used in Hungarian 
agriculture, only 25% is wage labour, 75% is provided by the land-owner and his 
family members. 
17 According to the 2008 OECD data, 20% of the Hungarian labour force is in the 
public sector, surpassed only by France and four Scandinavian countries. OECD 
(2012, 46). 
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regional differences. Without going into a detailed demographic analysis, 
we note that the employment ratios and the dependency ratios do not 
display large variations among the regions. The variation is caused by the 




Fig. 11-8 Regional GDP/head differences 
Source: Fazekas and Kézdi (2011, 312) 
(In percentage. National average = 100) 
Note: For the sake of visibility only four of the seven regions are shown. The 
numbers in brackets show the population size. 
 
The advantage of Central Hungary, which includes the capital city of 
Budapest, is one of historical heritage. However, ethnically speaking, 
Hungary is a homogenous country; the differences cannot come from such 
differences among the seven regions. We strongly believe that the labour 
productivity gap is caused by the law of increasing returns to scale. Apart 
from Budapest, there is no other city in Hungary that is large enough to be 
successful in Europe-wide competition. Almost all big firms are located in 
Budapest or in Central Hungary. In other towns, everything is too small, 
narrow and disconnected: the labour market, the local demand, the logistic 
network, and the spectrum of amusements offered.18 For a long time, it 
                                                          
18 The country is too small to make a domestic airline network viable. Only 
Budapest has an international airport deserving its name. In 1990, the nation’s 
capital had more than 2 million inhabitants; it has only 1.7 million today. The other 
larger towns have been also shrinking in size. The second and the third largest 
cities are Debrecen and Szeged with populations of 208,000 and 170,000, 
respectively. Compared with the US, according to a recent McKinsey (2012) report 
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was a widely shared opinion that the construction of motorways from 
Budapest towards the seven most important border-crossing points would 
equalise the investment climate throughout the country. The motorways 
are now up and running, but the hopes did not materialise. Most of the 
time, many new highways are almost empty. 
3.3.2 The consequences 
The low level and the slow growth of productivity in the SMEs – and 
in micro-firms in particular – have at least three devastating dynamic 
corollaries at the macroeconomic level. Each of them is important, but 
only the third point will be discussed in this paper: 
 
(1) SMEs cannot play a serious role in vocational training; 
(2) SMEs cannot be properly taxed; therefore, the authorities have to 
rely on other taxable sources; 
(3) SMEs have weak incentives to invest and to grow. 
 
If production capacities are under-utilised (as in retail trade) and yields 
are low (as in agriculture), then unit cost – and therefore prices – are 
bound to be excessive, which then inhibits the growth of demand. If there 
is no demand, the firm or the farm cannot grow. As Gábor (1994) noticed 
early on, the Hungarian SMEs have been suffocating in this vertiginous 
vicious circle for two decades. There are very few successful SMEs 
capable of growth to reach the size and maturity of a publicly traded firm. 
Between 2000 and 2009, there were only 22 initial public offerings (IPOs) 
on the Budapest Stock Exchange, while Prague can take pride in 95 such 
transactions. 
In societal terms, the size distribution of firms has a strong influence 
on the distribution of the fruits of economic growth. Because SMEs are 
operating with narrow profit margins, they will not generate sufficient 
investable funding. This is the explanation for the downward sloping 
investment curve in Figure 11-9. At this point, we again invoke the 
concept of circular causation. If the level of investment is low for a 
prolonged period of time, the capital stock will be outdated and this will 
negatively impact labour productivity. This relationship holds strictly not 
only at the firm level but also at the macro level if externalities are taken 
into account. 
 
                                                                                                                         
using data for 2010, 84% of the American GDP was generated in the largest 259 
US cities, with a population of 150,000 or more. 
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Fig. 11-9 The share of gross accumulation within GDP, 1960–2011 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
In a European EU-27 comparison, the Hungarian SMEs have the 
weakest record in innovation. In the latest 2011 edition of the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard, four statistical measures are used to assess the SME 
sector’s contribution to innovation (Table 11-3). Of these four, Hungary 
occupies the very last position in two, and its scores and rankings are 
disappointingly weak in the other two categories as well.19 
                                                          
19 Those who know the Hungarian economy may object to the above presented 
causation by saying that there are many large publicly owned companies and 
institutions, particularly in such capital intensive industries such as transport, 
healthcare and education; thus, a lot of investments and R&D must be financed by 
these public actors. Unfortunately, this objection does not hold. These companies 
and institutions – precisely because they are publicly owned – have been forced by 
the government to operate with low profit margins to keep their prices and/or fees 
low. 
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Table 11-3 The relative position of Hungarian SMEs as enablers of 
innovation, around 2010 
 
Share of … 
(in percentage of the 




















… SME’s introducing 
product or process 
innovation  





39.09 53.02 (Luxembourg) 20.52 (24th) 
Source: European Commission (2012b, 62–63) (Annex A) 
3.3.3 How did we get here? 
If the consequences are so serious, it is imperative to understand how 
micro-firms became so weighty in the Hungarian economy so soon after 
the regime change and why they could preserve their positions up to 
present times. The problem is also known to other countries. As shown in 
the Appendix, Portugal and Greece also have many small firms, and this 
finding may explain their anaemic growth and low productivity to a great 
extent. Furthermore, the Portuguese story is similar to the Hungarian case 
to the extent that after the fall of the Salazar dictatorship, consecutive 
governments had pursued a deliberate policy of demonopolisation. 
However, the similarities most likely end there. It has been shown 
convincingly by Braguinsky et al. (2011) that in Portugal the survival of 
inefficient small firms is chiefly explained by the strong protection for 
regular workers in their labour code and other legislation, which was 
instituted as a reaction to the anti-democratic constraints of the overthrown 
dictatorship. 
The labour code does cause problems in Hungary too; however, in our 
view, it is not the main explanation of the distorted company structure. In 
Greece, rigid product market rules seem to be the culprit. As a recent 
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McKinsey & Company (2012) report shows, Greek licensing and 
operating processes are extremely cumbersome. In a direct, regression-
based comparison the Hungarian data look better (McKinsey 2012, 20). 
While these international comparisons are always informative, we must 
look for explanations elsewhere to understand the Hungarian case. In our 
view, there are at least four other causational mechanisms that mutually 
reinforce each other and thus fatally undermine productivity growth at the 
macro level.  
During the first period of the socialist planned economy, the state 
merged all the previously existing privately owned SMEs into newly 
created state-owned enterprises. Subsequently, the administrative prices 
guaranteed that profits were all taxed away from the society and then 
redistributed as investments for the benefit of state-owned enterprises. 
Under such circumstances, the service sector shrank, causing a 
deterioration of the quality of life for consumers. As SMEs disappeared, 
many consumer goods and services became either inaccessible or 
accessible in only a few places. As is well known, there were long queues 
in shops, and diners could not find a free table in restaurants. After 1973, 
the situation improved somewhat in this regard, particularly in Hungary as 
compared with other socialist countries. However, only the regime change 
in 1989 opened the gates in front of the owners of SMEs. The huge pent-
up demand quickly created its own supply.20 The mushrooming SMEs 
made a significant contribution to consumers’ welfare, although this was 
not – and for methodological reasons could not be – measured as a part of 
output. This kind of statistical distortion holds even today, when wage or 
consumption figures from the pre-1990 figures are compared with current 
data. 
After the initial boom, the continued hypertrophy of micro- and small 
firms was largely due to the new legal environment. As land ownership 
had been constrained since 1994 and lax tax and credit rules and 
subsidised investment moneys were continuously pumped into the system, 
the micro-ventures looked competitive from the consumers’ perspective. 
The explanation is that half to two-thirds of the activities of micro- and 
small enterprises are in the grey and black economy, and this allows them 
to offer bargain prices. Hence, the large firms operating in the “white” 
economy cannot translate their higher productivity levels into lower prices 
and thus compete with the small firms. In addition, the small firms use 
fixed capital sparingly, which is logical from their perspective. This is 
even more logical if the aging of the owners is also taken into account. As 
                                                          
20 By 1994, the first year when such figures were released in comparable form with 
later data, the number of registered business units was already above 1.0 million. 
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tax returns show, the small firms write off more fixed capital than they 
actually replace. These mechanisms, as already mentioned, do not cause 
much obstruction in the manufacturing sector, but they are strongly present 
in agriculture, retail trade, the construction industry and in the areas of 
health and culture. Because the manufacturing sector is relatively small 
today (15–17% of GDP), its high and growing productivity cannot 
sufficiently improve the economy-wide average. 
The third reason that explains the survival of so many SMEs is that the 
customary market-clearing mechanism (the big fish eat the small fish) 
does not work effectively. Due to the lax accounting rules, the owners of 
small firms are able to hide their families’ personal consumption costs as 
costs of their enterprises.21 This is possible because in small firms the 
bookkeeping and the access to a firm’s bank accounts are typically 
controlled by the owner-manager, which is inconceivable in middle-size 
firms with more than 50 employees. In this way, the true proceeds of the 
small firms can be 50 to 100% more than the reported profits. The flip side 
of this situation is that the more competitive, larger firms cannot buy these 
smaller firms because the owner of the small firm would like to receive 5–
10 times his true annual proceeds, while the potential buyer (a larger 
company) can offer only 5–10 times the reported annual profits. 
Moreover, these widely used cost-hiding practices prevent horizontal 
cooperation among farmers, shopkeepers and even professional service 
providers, such as physicians, nurses, translators and artists. Because 
everybody has something to hide from the eyes of the taxman, they are all 
afraid to show their contracts, invoices and bills to each other. Without 
openness and transparency in their administration, they cannot fully 
cooperate with each other in their actual daily work.22 
Finally, the honest but erroneous conviction of Hungarian policy 
makers needs to be mentioned in which their continued support of SMEs 
is necessary to create new jobs. As in many other countries, there is a 
widespread and repeated claim, both in the business community and in 
government, that most new jobs are created by small businesses. In static 
terms, this is true for Hungary as well. However, “young” firms should not 
be confused with “small” firms. As everyday Hungarian experience 
suggests – and rigorous econometric investigation for the US proves 
                                                          
21 A few typical examples: the office is operating in the apartment or the family 
house of the owner, the family car is legally owned by the firm, the phone costs of 
the entire family are assumed by the family company, eating-out costs of the 
family are billed as client-related expenses, etc. 
22 For a general discussion on the importance of cooperation, see also Győrffy 
(2009) and Szalavetz (2010). 
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(Haltiwanger et al. 2010) – most new jobs are created by young firms that 
happened to be small at the beginning and not by those small firms that 
remained small even 5–10 years after their establishment. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper argues that Hungary has no other growth reserves than a 
more efficient allocation of the existing human and capital stock. Overall 
labour resource utilisation is comparable to our peers because the low 
participation rates are fully compensated by the higher average hours 
worked. Inward and outward migrations are promising but untapped 
channels. As for capital, the country today lacks large enterprises, which 
can maximise workers’ output through economies of scale and scope. 
Thus, there is a need for ownership concentration of fixed capital and 
natural resources (e.g., agricultural land and forests). Such a strategy 
would require a fast consolidation of micro- and small enterprises into 
transparently functioning middle-size and large firms. Paraphrasing the 
famous Marxist slogan, the new slogan should be, “Small entrepreneurs of 
Hungary, unite!” 
Once this is achieved by means of legal and administrative changes, 
Hungary will be once again an attractive investment opportunity to foreign 
investors. If the Hungarian labour force in the service sector, agriculture 
and elsewhere can generate extra profits for the owners of capital, the 
necessary financial means will be amply supplied by international capital 
markets. In practice, this will mean green field investments and 
privatisation of existing assets as well. 
In other words, low productivity in certain – but not in all – parts of the 
Hungarian economy is the primary structural barrier to overall economic 
growth. The labour participation issue is merely a symptom and – to a 
considerable extent – the result of government induced administrative 
distortions. The country’s low employment rate cannot be addressed 
before a massive productivity and profitability boost. This boost can no 
longer come from debt- and consumption-driven output growth, but rather 
from private sector investments in machinery and infrastructure. No doubt, 
a shift from consumption to investments, from wages to profits is 
politically difficult. Thus, there is a price to be paid for the acceleration of 
economic growth, just as there is a price to pay for the failure of catching 
up with the EU-15. The society has to change its mind-set. The majority of 
Hungarians today do not understand that production per se, good 
intentions, and diligence do not represent true values. If they as consumers 
do not buy something that is being produced (e.g., expensive Hungarian 
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agricultural products) or do not buy tickets to half-empty passenger trains 
in the countryside or do not enrol into the small countryside universities – 
then the continuation of such production or service provisions is simply a 
waste. Eventually, the price we pay is that the country as a whole will 
remain unable to catch up with our envied neighbours, such as Austria or 
even Slovakia. Both the public and the political elite of Hungary should 
understand and accept that there is no societal objective for which it is 
worth sacrificing the growth of labour productivity. At present, we are 
very far from this. 
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Appendix 
 
The number of micro, small, medium and large firms in selected EU 
member countries in 2009 (Per 10.000 of population) 
 
Micro firms 




(Employment: 10–49 workers, Annual revenue: > €10 million) 
 
 








(Employment: > 250 workers) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on EC Enterprise and Industry (2010) Small 
Business database 
 
